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TAKING AIM AT TIAHRT
How ABANDONING THE TIAHRT AMENDMENT ALLOWS AMERICA'S
CITIES TO REFORM "BAD APPLE"' GUN SELLERS THROUGH PUBLIC
NUISANCE LITIGATION
"Every gun has a story to tell."2
-William G. McMahon, Special Agent in Charge, New York Field
Office, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
1. The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence coined the term "bad apple," and numerous
sympathetic politicians use the term. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
WITHOUT A TRACE 12 (2006).
2. David B. Caruso, Agents Use New Tools To Trace Handguns, USA TODAY, July 15,
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-13-3248613554_x.htm.
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INTRODUCTION
Officer Russell Timoshenko of the New York City Police
Department was only twenty-three years old when he was shot
twice, in the face and neck, by an illegal .45-caliber Llama pistol.3
Timoshenko and his partner, Officer Herman Yan, had reason to be
suspicious of the BMW SUV 4 they pulled over at 2:30 a.m. on July
9, 2007, because the BMW's license plate belonged to a Mitsubishi.'
The BMW's darkly tinted windows6 did not allow Timoshenko and
Yan to see the three armed criminals inside the vehicle. v
Without warning, two of the vehicle's passengers shot at the
officers as they approached the vehicle.' A bulletproof vest saved
Yan's life.' Timoshenko was declared brain dead.' ° After five days
on life support, Officer Timoshenko died."
As convicted felons,' 2 Timoshenko's killers were not permitted to
own or carry firearms. 3 Yet they had three pistols: a TEC-9, the .45-
caliber Llama that killed Timoshenko, and a 9-millimeter Hi-Point
used to shoot Yan.1
4
3. Al Baker & Ethan Wilensky-Lanford, Police Hold Third Man in Shooting, Calling Him
the Leader, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at B1.
4. Id.
5. Timothy Williams, Officer Dies Five Days After Shooting in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2007, at A27.
6. Roy Furchgott, Seeing the Light. Then Again, Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007,
at 10.
7. Baker & Wilensky-Lanford, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. Williams, supra note 5.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The three men likely met in prison, where they served "extended sentences" for
"violent crimes." Baker & Wilensky-Lanford, supra note 3.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
... to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce.").
14. Baker & Wilensky-Lanford, supra note 3; John Marzulli et al., Tracing a Cop Killer,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 26, 2007, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime-
file/2007/07/26/2007-07-26_tracing-a-copkiller.html.
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Within hours" of the shooting, investigators used the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Gun Trace
System database to determine the origin of the three illegal guns. 6
The guns were originally sold out of state.'7 The Llama used to kill
Timoshenko had already been used in a "drive-by" shooting."8
The twice-murderous Llama led a typical gun life cycle, in which
traffickers purchase guns in localities with relatively lax gun con-
trol to illegally resell them in localities with strict gun control. 9
Guns recovered in New York are trafficked largely from Southern
states along Interstate 95, mostly from Virginia.2" The Llama was
originally purchased in Hampton, Virginia 2' from a dealer who sold
guns from his home and later lost his license to sell firearms.22 R&B
Guns was notorious for selling guns without following federal and
state laws.23
This pattern is also typical in gun trafficking. Although most gun
dealers, known as Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs), obey state
and federal gun sale laws, the small percentage of violators sell the
15. The shootings occurred at 2:30 a.m.; the guns were traced to the first retail purchaser
by 1:00 p.m. the same day. Caruso, supra note 2.
16. Baker & Wilensky-Lanford, supra note 3.
17. Id.
18. Caruso, supra note 2.
19. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (2000). The Gun Control Act makes it "unlawful ... for any
person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer ... to transport
into ... the State where he resides ... any firearm purchased or otherwise obtained ... outside
that State ...."
20. Allison Klein, In Study of Gun Traffic, Va. Stands Out, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2007,
at Al. Furthermore, 82 percent of guns used to commit crimes in New York City were
"brought in illegally from other states." Al Baker, U.S. Will Help City Pursue Cases Against
Gun Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at B2. For the calendar year 2006, of 11,893 guns
recovered in New York State, 7068 of those guns were recovered in New York City. BUREAU
OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, FIREARMS TRACE DATA 3, 6, 8 (2007),
http://www.atf.gov/ firearms/tracedata/2006/cy2006-newyork-rev.pdf. Of the 6085 guns that
were able to be traced to a source state, New York State was the greatest contributor, at 1784
guns. Id. Virginia was the second greatest contributor, selling 530 guns that were traced in
New York State. Id.
21. Marzulli, supra note 14.
22. AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUND., SELUNG CRIME 16 (2004), available at
httpJ/thirdway.orgtdata/product/file/98/AGSFSelling-Crime-Report.pdf.
23. R&B Guns was ranked fifth among Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs) for number
of crime guns sold in the U.S. from 1996-2000, having sold 1116 guns later used in crimes.
Id. at 9. R&B Guns was one of only thirty-five FFLs that sold more than 500 crime guns. Id.
at 8.
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vast majority of all crime guns.2 4 In fact, "[j]ust 1.2 percent of
dealers ... accounted for over 57 percent of the crime guns traced to
current dealers in 1998. "25 That statistic is even more glaring in
light of the fact that "85 percent of licensed dealers had no crime
gun traces in 1998.'26
This Note begins with the premise that the amount of gun
violence in America's cities is unacceptable and that "bad apple" gun
dealers fuel the violence by illegally selling guns to anyone willing
to pay street value. In Section I, this Note details the background
information needed to understand how access to trace data is crucial
to the success of municipal public nuisance suits. "Bad apple" gun
dealers funnel more guns into the illegal secondary market than any
other source, and action against "bad apple" gun dealers can
therefore take guns out of criminals' hands.27
Ideally, federal legislators could attack the illegal gun problem by
mandating stricter oversight of FFLs and by giving ATF sufficient
authority and resources to quickly identify and shut down repeat
violators of firearms sale laws.28 The reality, however, is that the
24. "[A]n extremely small number of FFLs ... are involved with a large, disparate number
of firearms recovered at crime scenes.'" BRADY CTR. To PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note
1, at 12 (quoting GLENN L. PIERCE ET AL., THE IDENTIFICATION OF PATrERNS OF FIREARMS
TRAFFICKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOCUSED ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES ii (1995)).
25. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2000), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps4006/020400report.pdf
[hereinafter COMMERCE IN FIREARMS]. More recent statistics encompassing a broader period
of time show 15 percent of all crime gun traces between 1996 and 2000 were from approx-
imately one-tenth of one percent of FFLs. AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUNDATION, supra
note 22, at 2-4.
26. BRADY CTR. To PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 12.
27. Local enforcement is effective. In Chicago, "undercover stings of gun dealers suspected
of making unlawful sales" resulted in a "forty-six percent decline in the flow of new guns to
criminals." Jon S. Vernick et al., Regulation of Firearms Dealers in the United States: An
Analysis of State Law and Opportunities for Improvement, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 765, 765
(2006). Likewise, one major Milwaukee dealer's decision to stop selling "Saturday night
special[s]" resulted in a "forty-four percent decline in ... newly trafficked guns to criminals"
in the city. Id. at 766. The problem, however, is that local law enforcement cannot reach out-
of-state "bad apple" dealers.
28. A self-scathing 2004 internal Department of Justice report noted that "ATFIs
inspection program is not fully effective" and that "most FFLs are inspected infrequently or
not at all." OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REP. No. 1-2004-005,
INSPECTION OF FIREARMS DEALERS BY THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND
EXPLOSIVES i, iii (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e0405/final.pdf.
Citing "resource shortfalls," the report noted that ATF conducted "4,581 FFL compliance
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legislative process is frustrated by powerful special interest groups,
such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), that vehemently
oppose gun control measures. 29 Cities are left on their own to rid
their streets of illegal guns. Strict state and local gun laws are the
first line of defense, but they pose little impediment for criminals
willing to flout the laws. °
Unable to force legislative change, the cities have turned to
litigation, filing public nuisance claims against "bad apple" gun
sellers. Section I of this Note describes the current state of munici-
pal public nuisance litigation efforts and will demonstrate that trace
data is crucial to the success of public nuisance claims. This Section
goes on to describe how the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act (PLCAA),31 which requires dismissal of all but a few excepted
classes of gun lawsuits, has made it more difficult for cities to bring
public nuisance suits. The PLCAA has forced cities to change their
strategies in bringing public nuisance claims. One such example of
the new strategy lies in the actions that the City of New York took
in investigating out-of-state gun sellers targeted in City of New York
v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn."
Section II of this Note details how Congress has appended a rider,
known as the Tiahrt Amendment, into appropriations acts funding
ATF every year since 2003. This Amendment is widely interpreted
to prohibit release of gun trace data to civil litigants.
In Section III, this Note urges Congress to abandon the Tiahrt
Amendment because it was not passed into law for the reason
asserted-protection of law enforcement-but rather, was passed
solely to interfere with gun industry litigation. To support this con-
inspections in FY 2002, or about 4.5 percent of ... FFLs nationwide." Id. at iii. It would take
"more than 22 years" to inspect all FFLs at the 2002 annual rate. Id.
29. For example, ATF, on authority of the Attorney General, may inspect an FFL no more
than once per year to ensure that the FFL maintains the records required by the Gun Control
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B) (2000). Thus, ATF is prevented from focusing its limited
resources on the dealers most likely to engage in illegal gun sales. See AMERICANS FOR GUN
SAFETY FOUNDATION, supra note 22, at 11-14.
30. Strong local gun laws curtail the local illegal gun market. This is evidenced by the fact
that crime guns found in cities with strong local gun laws are largely traced to out-of-state
FFLs. "If New York criminals could access local New York state sources of crime guns, they
obviously would do so." BRADY CTR. To PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 14.
31. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2006).
32. 501 F. Supp. 2d 369, 425-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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tention, Section III details how Congress has continually strength-
ened and modified the Amendment in response to court decisions
allowing civil litigants to use trace data in gun industry litigation.
In Section IV, this Note argues that Congress should abandon the
Tiahrt Amendment because it is redundant of the PLCAA and
because the Amendment does not protect law enforcement. Rather,
the stated goal of protecting law enforcement can be better served
by sensible data release procedures that protect sensitive data but
also allow for limited use of the data in litigation.
Finally, this Note discusses the intersection of the Tiahrt
Amendment with the PLCAA, and how municipal litigants can
continue to pursue suits in light of these two roadblocks. In so doing,
the Note posits that the combination of facts and pleadings in City
of New York33 has the best chance of success in the litigation battle
against "bad apple" gun sellers.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Gun Trafficking Patterns: A Few "Bad Apples"... and Worse
Guns
"Bad apple" gun sellers exploit weaknesses in federal gun sale
laws to divert legal guns to the illegal secondary gun market. The
Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) requires manufacturers, distribu-
tors, and retailers to maintain records of gun transactions from
the manufacturer, to the distributor, to the first retail store, and
ultimately, to the first retail purchaser.34 After the first retail sale,
however, the Act places no restrictions on the manner of sale and
requires no record of the sale.35 Thus, there is a high potential for
33. Id. (rejecting out-of-state gun seller defendants' arguments that the City of New York
lacked personal jurisdiction over them).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) (2000).
35. Id. Some states regulate secondary sales of handguns. See Gun Control Policy Issues,
http://newsbatch.com/guncontrol.htm (last visited Mar. 5,2009). For example, New York State
requires that all persons who sell or transfer a firearm, rifle, or shotgun at a gun show must
comply with 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) by completing a National Instant Criminal Background Check.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 897 (McKinney 2008). The provision applies to "all persons" without
regard to whether the seller is a private person or a firearms dealer, and it applies to all sales
and transfers without regard to whether the gun is being sold for the first or subsequent time.
See id.
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abuse by FFLs and first purchasers to funnel legally purchased
guns into the illegal secondary market. After all, every illegal 38 gun
began as a legal gun.3 ' Legal guns enter the illegal secondary
market through a variety of channels, including corrupt FFLs, straw
purchasers, gun shows, unlicensed sellers, and firearms theft .38 This
Note focuses on FFLs and straw purchasers, as corrupt FFLs that
flout gun sale laws provide more firearms to the secondary market
than any other source. 9 These gun dealers knowingly sell to "pro-
hibited persons," make "false entries" regarding sales, and falsely
report illegally sold guns as lost or stolen.4" They also knowingly sell
to unlicensed dealers who will resell to prohibited persons.41 "Bad
apple" dealers exist hand-in-hand with straw purchasers. Straw
purchasers are persons who are legally permitted to purchase guns,
but who purchase guns, ostensibly for themselves, only immediately
to sell them to prohibited purchasers.42 Straw purchases are illegal
under federal law and under many states' laws.43
36. This Note uses the term "illegal gun" to refer to guns that were not sold according to
federal and state gun sale laws.
37. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING
FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS TRAFFICKERS 3 (2000), available at http://www.atf.
treas.gov/pub/fire-explo-pub/pdf/followingthegun-internet.pdf [hereinafter FOLLOWING THE
GUN]. "Unlike narcotics or other contraband, the criminals' supply of guns does not begin in
clandestine factories or with illegal smuggling." Id. at iii.
38. Id. at x-xi.
39. During a two-year period from 1996-1998, corrupt FFLs were responsible for diverting
"nearly half of the total number of trafficked firearms" during the study period. Id. at x.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1 n.4. Criminals also engage in straw purchases to "conceal[ ] the identity of the
true intended receiver" of the firearm. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, CRIME
GUN TRACE REPORTS (2000) NEW YORK A-5 (2002), available at http://www.atf.gov/firearms/
ycgiiJ2000/cityreports/newyorkcity.pdf [hereinafter CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS].
43. Some federal circuits allow prosecution of straw purchases under 18 U.S.C. §
924(a)(1)(A), which prohibits "knowingly mak[ing] any false statement ... with respect to the
information required ... to be kept in the records of a [FFL] ..." and subjects the violator to a
fine and up to five years' imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) (2000). In serious offenses,
some courts apply 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which makes it unlawful "for any person in
connection with the acquisition ... of any firearm ... from [an FFL] knowingly to make any
false ... statement ... intended ... to deceive [the FFL] with respect to any fact material to the
lawfulness of the sale" of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2000). A violation of § 922(a)(6)
carries up to a ten-year prison sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2000). For an example of a
state law prohibiting straw purchases, see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2 & -6.
1794
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Once a formerly legal gun reaches the secondary market, pro-
hibited carriers44 are able to arm themselves. Cities like New York
City and Washington, D.C. passed strict gun control schemes,45 but
gun traffickers undermine these schemes by buying guns outside
the city or state, then selling them illegally inside the city.4" This
illegal gun market provided Officer Timoshenko's killers with
deadly weapons.
B. ATF Gun Trace System
1. Primary Purpose: Tracing Guns
Law enforcement officials can use the ATF Gun Trace System
database to identify the distribution path and first buyer of a
firearm. Gun dealers must maintain records of firearms sales.47 The
information in these records becomes incorporated into the Trace
System database when a gun is traced. When a crime gun is found,
the law enforcement agency submits the following information to
44. Amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 made it unlawful for felons, domestic
offenders, and the mentally ill-among others-to "possess ... any firearm ... or to receive any
firearm ... which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000).
45. The District of Columbia had a complete ban on possession of any handgun not
registered in the District prior to September 24, 1976. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001). The
Supreme Court struck down the District's absolute ban on handguns in the home for self
defense as violating the Second Amendment. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2817-22 (2008). The City of New York regulates firearms sales more strictly than the State
of New York. The City requires a firearms purchaser to have not only a New York State
License, but also a New York City permit issued by the police commissioner. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 400.00 (McKinney 2008). The City permit must be renewed at three-year intervals-shorter
intervals than those required by state law. Compare id. (state law making licenses valid until
revoked, except in designated counties and the City of New York), with NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.,
CODE § 10-131 (2008) (allowing maximum three-year license on pistols and revolvers) and
NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 10-303(f) (2008) (allowing maximum three-year license on
shotguns and rifles). Although the State does not require licensing of shotguns over eighteen
inches or rifles over sixteen inches, the City does require licensing of those weapons. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 265.00 (McKinney 2008) (defining "firearms" as excluding shotguns over
eighteen inches or rifles over sixteen inches); NRA/ILA, FIREARMS LAWS FOR NEW YORK
(2008), available at http://www.nraila.orgtstatelawpdfs/ NYSL.pdf.
46. Certain jurisdictions-for example southern states-are known "source areas" that
generate crime guns for "market areas," such as New York City, Boston, and other East Coast
cities. FOLLOWING THE GUN, supra note 37, at 23.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (2000).
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ATF: "serial number, firearm type, manufacturer... and caliber;" the
circumstances and location where the firearm was found; the crime
in which the gun was used; and the name of the person with whom
the gun is associated.48 This information becomes part of the gun
trace database.
Once the National Tracing Center (NTC), the subdivision of ATF
tasked with maintaining the gun trace database, receives the fire-
arms trace request, it initiates the trace procedure.49 First, the NTC
compares the gun serial number to the trace records maintained by
ATF.5° If the gun sale was not included in ATF's records, the NTC
pursues the trace by contacting the manufacturer or importer.5' The
manufacturer must identify the purchasing distributor.52 The NTC
then contacts the distributor to learn the identity of the first retail
seller. 3 Finally, the NTC contacts the first retail seller, who must
disclose the first retail purchaser's name.5" If law enforcement
agents must trace the gun further beyond the first retail sale of a
new handgun,55 they can accomplish this only through "shoe-leather
detective work."5 They must interview the first retail purchaser as
to the whereabouts of the gun and then follow any leads from that
point forward. 7
48. COMMERCE IN FIREARMS, supra note 25, at 19 & n.30.
49. Id. at 19.
50. ATF maintains records from out-of-business FFLs and records on multiple gun sales.
Id. at 20. When an FFL goes out of business, it must deliver its firearms records maintained
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923 to the Attorney General within thirty days. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(4)
(2000). An FFL must send a multiple sales report to ATF whenever an unlicensed person buys
two or more total pistols or revolvers during a period of five consecutive business days. Id. §
923(3)(A).
51. COMMERCE IN FIREARMS, supra note 25, at 20.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The law requiries FFLs to respond to a trace request "immediately ... and in no
event later than 24 hours." 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(7) (2000).
55. Used handgun sales by FFLs need not be recorded. See COMMERCE IN FIREARMS, supra
note 25, at 26 & n.40.
56. Caruso, supra note 2.
57. It is no accident that the firearms trace process is inefficient and complicated due to
decentralized records and lack of a central database. ATF is statutorily prohibited from
establishing a centralized firearms database. 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2000).
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2. Secondary Purpose: Identifying Gun Traffickers
In addition to its primary purpose in identifying the ownership
and distribution path of a suspect handgun, law enforcement
officials can use the gun trace database to identify gun traffickers.
Prior to the mid-1990s, law enforcement agencies used the Trace
System only sporadically, and FFLs were not legally required to
provide requested purchase data.5" President Clinton expanded
the use of the Trace System by instituting the Youth Crime Gun
Interdiction Initiative (YCGII). 9 Cities began "comprehensive"
firearms tracing, which traced all crime guns.6 ° As firearm tracing
became more regular, the quantity and quality of the data in the
trace database increased tremendously."' The trace database be-
came a powerful tool for identifying firearm trafficking patterns.62
ATF cooperated with Northeastern University to develop
"trafficking indicators."63 These include:
[M]ultiple crime guns traced to an FFL or first retail purchaser;
short time-to-crime' for crime guns traced to an FFL or first
retail purchaser; incomplete trace results; significant or fre-
quently reported firearms losses or thefts by an FFL; frequent
multiple sales of handguns by an FFL or multiple purchases of
firearms by a non-licensee, combined with crime gun traces; and
recovery of firearms with obliterated serial numbers."
58. BRADY CTR. To PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 8.
59. Id. at 8-9. Focusing on juvenile gun possession is especially indicative of illegal gun
trafficking patterns because juveniles are "prohibited from ... possessing handguns without
parental involvement." Thus "some form of illegal diversion is almost always implicated in an
investigation involving a juvenile's possession of a handgun." CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS,
supra note 42, at 3.
60. CRIME GuN TRACE REPORTS, supra note 42, at 3.
61. BRADY CTR. To PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 8-9.
62. CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS, supra note 42, at 4.
63. COMMERCE IN FIREARMS, supra note 25, at 22.
64. "[T]he time between the initial retail sale of a firearm by an FFL and its recovery as
a crime gun or as the subject of a trace request. Time-to-crime of three years or less is con-
sidered an important trafficking indicator ...." Id. at 21 n.33.
65. Id. at 22.
2009] 1797
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Armed with this knowledge, ATF is able to target certain FFLs for
monitoring so that the limited resources can be expended effi-
ciently.6"
A more controversial use for this data has been in civil litigation
against the gun industry. Every trace request puts the affected
manufacturer, distributor, or FFL on notice that they sold a gun
that may have been used in a crime. 7 Litigants have used this form
of notice as evidence that the defendant manufacturer, distributor,
or FFL knew or should have known that it was supplying guns used
in crimes. 8
Although analysis of aggregate crime gun trace data can draw
ATF's attention to suspected gun traffickers, some commentators
have criticized the data as misleading.69 Despite inherent inaccura-
cies in trace data as a representation of the aggregate illegal
firearms market, a flawed representation is better than no represen-
tation at all. The data cannot be highly misleading because ATF
itself uses trace data to "focus[] its inspections on ... FFLs that
exhibit most severely ... indicators of trafficking."7
C. Municipal Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry
Facing staggering gun violence statistics, cities have decided to
fight the gun industry through the courts-and gun trace data plays
a key role in the litigation. Taking a cue from tobacco litigation, the
66. Id. at 25.
67. Crime Gun Trace Reports, produced by ATF under the YCGII initiative, have three
purposes, one of which is to "inform [FFLs] of crime gun patterns, allowing them to build
sounder and safer businesses." CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS, supra note 42, at 1.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
69. COMMERCE IN FIREARMS, supra note 25, at 25 (describing the "limitations" of the
Firearms Tracing System). Not all traced guns are crime guns. See also Philip J. Cook &
Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and Investigative Uses of New
Data on Firearms Markets, 43 AIZ. L. REV. 277 (2001); Gary Kleck, BATF Gun Trace Data
and the Role of Organized Gun Trafficking in Supplying Guns to Criminals, 18 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 23 (1999).
70. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT No. 1-2004-005,
INSPECTION OF FIREARMS DEALERS BY THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND
EXPLOSIVES iii (2004).
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cities were aware of the crippling effect litigation could have on the
industry, forcing the industry to voluntarily change its ways.7'
Municipalities have made claims against the gun industry under
a variety of theories, including negligence, product liability, and
public nuisance. 72 At first, the public nuisance claims foundered in
the courts.73 After this period of hesitancy, however, some cities
have enjoyed success.
All states recognize public nuisance as a tort, either through
common law or through statutory codification.74 A public nuisance
is an "unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public. ' '75 A public entity or a private citizen may bring a suit, but
for a private citizen to have standing, she must suffer a "harm of a
kind different from that suffered by" the general public.76 This is
known as the "special injury" rule.
The basic argument is as follows. Gun sellers, distributors, and
manufacturers deliberately engage in practices that funnel guns
into the illegal secondary gun market. 77 In this illegal market, pro-
hibited buyers have ready access to firearms.78 Supplying criminals
and prohibited persons with guns endangers the public health and
"interferes with" law-abiding citizens' use of public space.79 Gun
71. For a discussion of the complementary role of tort law in policymaking, see generally
Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis,
32 CONN. L. REv. 1247 (2000).
72. Private litigants also pursue these claims against the gun industry. This Note
concerns itself only with municipal litigants in public nuisance suits, based on the opinion
that governments are better suited to bring these suits against the gun industry than private
parties. Municipal suits seeking injunctive relief on behalf of the citizens and abatement of
the nuisance are viewed as more legitimate instruments of change compared to private
litigants seeking monetary damages for their own harms. For similar arguments favoring
municipal public nuisance suits over private suits, see Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G.
Culhane, Public Nuisance Claims Against Gun Sellers: New Insights and Challenges, 38 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 1 (2004).
73. Various commentators have indicated that, in the early attempts at using public
nuisance suits against the gun industry, the tort was "poorly understood" by the courts, partly
because it had historically been used to redress harms related to land. Id. at 4.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c (1979).
75. Id. § 821B.
76. Id. § 821C. For an overview of the public nuisance tort in the context of gun litigation,
see Developments in the Law-The Use of the Public Nuisance Tort Against the Handgun
Industry, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2000).
77. See, e.g., NAACP v. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 446.
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manufacturers" knowingly flood the gun market with more guns
than are needed to satisfy legal demand, expecting that the guns
will be resold illegally.81 This is especially true of excessive sales to
regions with lax gun sale laws located near cities with strict gun
sales laws.82 The gun industry could take precautions to abate this
nuisance, including: 'limiting multiple retail sales," training sellers
to identify straw purchasers, refusing to sell to "bad apple" FFLs,
and refusing to sell to FFLs without legitimate retail establish-
ments.8 3
The gun industry defends its conduct by asserting that the
practices charged by plaintiffs, even if true, do not violate state or
federal gun sale laws or ATF regulations.' The industry claims that
it cannot be held "responsible for the acts of criminals they cannot
control," referring both to acts of violent criminals as well as gun
traffickers.85 The industry also argues that neither individual gun
sellers, manufacturers or distributors, nor the "industry as a whole"
causes either the "diversion of handguns to criminals" or any "public
nuisance. 86
Recent public nuisance plaintiffs have survived motions for
summary judgment. Successes include City of New York v. Beretta,87
Ileto v. Glock,"8 and NAACP v. Acusport.9 Ileto was a private action
brought by victims and victims' survivors of a shooting at a Wendy's
restaurant against the "manufacturers, distributors, and dealers of
80. Although this Note takes the position that municipal public nuisance claims are best
brought against "bad apple" gun sellers, this Note must trace the early uses of the public
nuisance cause of action, in which municipalities targeted gun manufacturers and distributors
as well as sellers.
81. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
82. Id. at 510.
83. Id. at 447; Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003); District of Columbia v.
Beretta, 872 A.2d 633,638 (D.C. 2005); City of New York v. Beretta, 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 263
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
84. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 447. Simply because the defendant's conduct is lawful,
however, does not immunize the defendant against public nuisance liability. Beretta, 315 F.
Supp. 2d at 280.
85. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
86. Id.
87. 315 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
88. 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (This case was later dismissed as not being a valid
exception to the PLCAA. Ileto v. Glock, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
89. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 435.
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firearms used" in the shootings."0 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
dismissal of plaintiffs' claim, holding that the plaintiffs asserted a
"cognizable claim" for public nuisance.91
In Acusport, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) brought a private party public nuisance
claim against the "main manufacturers, importers, and distributors
of handguns in the United States." 2 The NAACP alleged that it
satisfied the "special kind of harm" requirement because its
"members and potential members- ... predominately African
Americans-did suffer relatively more harm from the nuisance."93
Acusport was unique among public nuisance cases because it was
tried before an advisory jury as to whether defendants created a
public nuisance. 4 At trial, defendants prevailed only because the
NAACP failed to satisfy the special injury rule by failing to show
that the NAACP members were harmed in a way different from the
general populace.95 A loss for NAACP, the case was a "win" for New
York City because the court held that "[p]laintiff did establish by
clear and convincing evidence the first two of the three elements" of
public nuisance. s6 In an extensive opinion, Judge Weinstein of the
Eastern District of New York went to great lengths to indicate that
the NAACP proved that the defendants exhibited "negligent or
intentional conduct or omissions ... that create, contribute to, or
maintain [a] public nuisance."97
Additionally, Judge Weinstein outlined and then discounted
possible roadblocks to defendants' liability, including state prece-
dents and the Second Amendment.98 The opinion sent a message to
the State and the City that the court was ready to recognize a public
nuisance claim against the gun industry if either government were
to bring a suit alleging the same facts as in Acusport. The City did
this when, under Mayor Michael Bloomberg, it resumed litigation
in City of New York v. Beretta that had been previously instituted
90. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1191.
91. Id. at 1194.
92. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
93. Id. at 451.
94. Id. at 435.
95. Id. at 448-49.
96. Id. at 449.
97. Id. at 448.
98. See id. at 457-63.
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under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in B.L. Jennings.99 The City
amended the original complaint to proceed solely on a public
nuisance claim, alleging the same facts against the same defendants
as in Acusport.1°° The City achieved success in Beretta when the
district court rejected defendants' motion for summary judgment.101
Not all courts were willing to recognize public nuisance claims
against the gun industry. In some cases, the litigants did not
provide sufficient data to establish a connection between the
industry's practice and the public nuisance. 102 Other courts were
reluctant to extend the public nuisance tort to cover this type of
claim. In City of Chicago v. Beretta, the court refused to find that
there was a public right, as opposed to an individual right, to be
"free from the threat that members of the public may commit crimes
against individuals."'13 The California Court of Appeals read a
requirement of causation and duty into the three elements of public
nuisance.0 4 In so doing, the court affirmed dismissal because
municipal plaintiffs failed to "establish a causal connection between
the ... [gun sales] practices and the harm ....'105 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals was reluctant to "loosen the tort [of
public nuisance] from the traditional moorings of duty, proximate
causation, foreseeability, and remoteness .... 0'
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint likely to survive summary
judgment must allege very specific facts, based on aggregate trace
data, to establish causation and the gun industry's knowledge that
its sales practices contribute to the public nuisance. Without trace
data establishing defendants' complicity in fueling the illegal gun
market, public nuisance claims will fail. Additionally, the Protection
99. The original B.L. Jennings action was stayed after September 11, 2001, and to await
appeal of Acusport and one other public nuisance case in state court. The stay was lifted on
January 13, 2004. City of New York v. B.L. Jennings, 219 F.R.D. 255, 255-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
100. Id. at 257.
101. Beretta, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 262.
102. Judge Weinstein in Acusport indicated that this was the flaw that required dismissal
of State of New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. for failure to state a claim. In Acusport, however,
plaintiffs had access to extensive trace data made available in a previous public nuisance case.
Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 458.
103. 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1114-15 (Ill. 2004).
104. In re Firearm Cases, 126 Cal. App. 4th 959, 988 (App. 1st Dist. 2005).
105. Id. at 967.
106. District of Columbia v. Beretta, 872 A.2d 633, 646 (D.C. 2005) (dismissing the
District's public nuisance claim against gun industry defendants).
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of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, a bill that requires dismissal of
all but a few excepted types of lawsuits against the gun industry,
makes trace data even more critical to municipal litigants' success
in pursuing "bad apple" gun sellers through the courts.
D. PLCAA
In response to litigation successes, and due to the intense
lobbying efforts of the NRA, state legislatures and Congress have
granted the gun industry sweeping immunity. Although many
states °7 already had legislation immunizing the gun industry from
negligence suits arising from nondefective products, in 2005,
Congress passed the PLCAA.
Claiming that gun industry lawsuits unreasonably interfere with
the Second Amendment right to bear arms, Congress legislated that
"[a] qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal
or State court." ' The Act also requires: "A qualified civil liability
action that is pending on [the date of enactment of this Act] ... shall
be immediately dismissed .... ,,' A "qualified civil liability action" is:
A civil action ... brought ... against a manufacturer or seller of [a
firearm] ... for damages, ... injunctive, ... or other relief, resulting
from the criminal... misuse of a [firearm] by... a third party, but
shall not include
(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a [firearm]
knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the
sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a
proximate cause of the harm .... 11
Courts with pending public nuisance gun suits immediately had
to determine whether the PLCAA required dismissal of the suits.
107. Only twenty states have resisted passing gun industry immunity legislation. Brady
Campaign-Special Protection for the Gun Industry: State Bills, http://web.archive.org
web/2 0080213094354/http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/issuesl?page=immun-state (last
visited Mar. 5, 2009).
108. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2006).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 7903(5)(A). Other exceptions include suits against sellers for negligent
entrustment and suits against manufacturers for breach of warranty or design or
manufacturing defect. Id.
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Courts reached diverging opinions over the PLCAA's meaning. The
first case to address the issue was City of New York v. Beretta."'
Defendants requested dismissal, claiming that the action did not fit
within any of the exceptions to "qualified civil liability action[s] .,,112
The City claimed that the lawsuit fit within the exception allowing
an action in which a "manufacturer or seller ... knowingly violated
a ... statute applicable to the sale or marketing" of the firearm.'13
The disagreement between the parties was whether the words
"'applicable'to the sale or marketing" of the firearm encompassed all
statutes capable of being applied to firearms sales, such as public
nuisance or negligence, or whether the statute had to have as its
main purpose the regulation of firearms sales.114 The court in
Beretta adopted the first interpretation and held that the public
nuisance statute was "applicable to the sale or marketing" of the
firearm insofar as it is "capable" of being applied to firearms sales." 5
Thus, the PLCAA did not require dismissal of the suit.
1 6
Three months later, a California District Court reached the op-
posite conclusion in Ileto v. Glock, holding that a case satisfied the
PLCAA's predicate exception only if the plaintiff could allege that
the defendant violated a law specifically regulating gun sales."7 In
October 2007, the Court of Appeals of Indiana followed the lead of
the court in City of New York v. Beretta, allowing the City of Gary's
public nuisance claim to proceed." 8 In January 2008, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion as the court
in Ileto v. Glock"9 : that the PLCAA required dismissal of the
District of Columbia's suit under its Assault Weapons Manufactur-
111. 401 F. Supp. 2d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
112. Id. at 258.
113. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 258; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
114. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 261.
116. Id. at 271.
117. 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (dismissing plaintiffs' claim with prejudice as
required by the narrow interpretation of the PLCAA predicate exemption).
118. Smith & Wesson v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. App. 2007). The court was
reviewing manufacturer defendants' motion to dismiss. The seller defendants did not argue
that the PLCAA required dismissal of the case against them, as the City had used an
undercover "sting" operation to catch the seller defendants making straw purchases. City of
Gary is unique among PLCAA public nuisance cases because the court allowed the claim to
go forward against the manufacturers as well as sellers. See id. at 425.
119. See supra text accompanying note 117.
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ing Strict Liability Act (SLA) 20 because the SLA was not "applicable
to the sale or marketing" of a firearm in the sense that regulation
of the sale of firearms was not its main purpose.12' Thus, it depends
on the jurisdiction as to whether a plaintiff in a pure public
nuisance case-without alleging violation of a firearms sales
statute-will survive a motion to dismiss under the PLCAA. If a
plaintiff can assert that the defendant knowingly violated a statute
specifically aimed at firearms sales, the defendant can make no
claim-other than causation-that the PLCAA requires dismissal
of the suit.
E. Litigating the PLCAA City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry &
Pawn
Armed with this knowledge, the City of New York engaged in
the undercover tactics that led to the City's public nuisance suit
against out-of-state FFLs in A-1 Jewelry & Pawn.'22 In order to
allege violation of gun sale laws, the City sent private investigators
to fifteen FFLs to engage blatantly in straw purchases. 23 The City
selected these sellers because their trace data exhibited trafficking
indicators.'24 The City of New York filed a public nuisance and
statutory nuisance suit in May 2006 alleging that the out-of-state
gun sellers' deliberate violations of federal and their own state gun
sale laws caused a public nuisance in New York City.125 The City
filed a companion suit against twelve additional gun sellers in
120. D.C. CODE § 7-2551.02 (2007). The SLA makes any "manufacturer, importer, or dealer
of an assault weapon or machine gun ... strictly liable in tort ... for all direct and consequential
damages that arise from ... injury or death" if the injury or death "proximately results from
the discharge of the ... weapon ... in the District of Columbia." Id.
121. District of Columbia v. Beretta, 940 A.2d 163, 169-70 (D.C. 2008). In this manner, the
court followed the narrower construction of the words "applicable to" the sale and marketing
of handguns, rather than the broader construction of"capable of being applied to" the sale and
marketing of handguns, which was the approach followed in City of New York v. Beretta and
City of Gary. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
122. City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, 501 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374, 377 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
123. Id. at 374. The City targeted gun sellers in Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
124. Id. at 376-99. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 374.
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December 2006.126 The City sought injunctive relief ordering
defendants to abate the nuisances. 2 7 Specifically, the City asked
the court to order the defendants: to obey local, state, and federal
gun sale laws; to desist from allowing straw purchases; to train
their sales associates in gun laws; and to submit to a court-ap-
pointed special master's oversight to monitor sales practices for
compliance.'28 To date, twenty-one of the twenty-seven gun shops
have settled out of court. 29 The settlement agreements grant the
City the remedies sought in the lawsuit.3 °
In a hundred-page decision' 3' denying the remaining defendants'
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Judge Weinstein
relied heavily on gun trace data to show that each gun seller had
extensive contacts with the City.'32 To establish that each defen-
dant served a "de facto" market in New York, the judge cited the
following facts for each gun seller: percentage of a seller's crime
guns recovered in New York; "repeated instances" of multiple
handgun sales; total number of the seller's guns recovered in New
York; average time to crime; number of Saturday Night Specials
recovered in New York; number and types of crimes committed in
New York with the seller's guns; whether the FFL met ATF's
criteria for heightened scrutiny based on trafficking indicators;
number of trafficking prosecutions arising from straw purchases at
defendant's store; and percentage of guns sold that were used in
126. City of New York v. Bob Moates' Sport Shop, No. 06-CV-6504, 2008 WL 427964, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2008).
127. Complaint at 2, City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, 501 F. Supp. 2d 369
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 CV 02233).
128. Id. at 77.
129. Press Release, Michael Bloomberg, Statement by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg About
Pre-Trial Victory in Case Against Adventure Outdoors Gun Shop (June 2, 2008) (announcing
that Adventure Outdoors, the last remaining defendant in the A-1 Jewelry & Pawn litigation,
agreed to settle); Press Release, Michael Bloomberg, Mayor Bloomberg Announces
Settlements With Five Additional Gun Dealers Named in New York City Lawsuits (Apr. 11,
2008) (announcing that twenty sellers had settled as of April 2008).
130. Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, available at
http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.orgdownloads/pdf/generic-settlement-agreement.pdf.
131. Mark Fass, New York City's Suit Against Gun Dealers Proceeds, LAW.COM, Aug. 16,
2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1187168529377.
132. See City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, 501 F. Supp. 2d 369, 383-410 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (detailing each defendant's history of sales of guns to the City of New York).
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crimes. 3 Thus, access to trace data is essential to the success of a
municipal public nuisance suit against "bad apple" dealers.
Public nuisance suits like A-1 Jewelry & Pawn actually make
cities safer. Daniel Webster, Co-Director of the Johns Hopkins
Center for Gun Policy and Research,' studied the sales of seven
dealers who had settled with the City of New York and agreed to
monitoring by a special master.'35 The report found that "the
probability that guns sold by the defendant dealers would be
recovered by police in [New York] City within one year of retail sale
decreased 75% from their pre-sting levels."'36 Unfortunately, the
City's ability to use this data in this and future public nuisance
suits is endangered by an appropriations rider known as the Tiahrt
Amendment.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE TIAHRT AMENDMENT
A. 2003
Beginning in 2003, Congress has appended a seemingly innocuous
rider to the appropriations bill funding ATF. Congress has continu-
ally strengthened the rider in response to the judiciary's handling
of gun litigation cases.
The sponsor of the funding rider was Representative Todd Tiahrt,
a Republican Congressman representing the Fourth District of
Kansas since 1995. 17 Tiahrt wanted the Amendment to "fulfill[ ] the
needs of [his] friends who are firearms dealers," and consulted NRA
officials in drafting the language.3 3 The initial Tiahrt Amendment,
appended to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2003, stated
that:
133. See id. at 383-411.
134. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Faculty, http://faculty.jhsph.edu/
default.cfm?F=-Daniel&L=Webster (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
135. Press Release, Michael Bloomberg, Statement by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg About
Pre-Trial Victory in Case Against Adventure Outdoors Gun Shop (June 2, 2008).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Congressman Todd Tiahrt, About Todd, http://tiahrt.house.gov/?sectionid=45&section
tree=45 (last visited Mar. 5, 2009).
138. BRADY CENTER To PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 28 (quoting Juliet
Eilperin, Firearms Measure Surprises Some in GOP, WASH. POST, July 21, 2003, at A19).
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No funds appropriated under this Act ... shall be available to
take any action based upon... [the Freedom of Information Act]
with respect to records ... maintained pursuant to [the GCA] ...
or provided by ... law enforcement agencies in connection with...
the tracing of a firearm .... '
The Appropriations Committee Report expressed the concern that
releasing trace data under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
could compromise "ongoing criminal investigations of firearms ...
offenses."14
Congress passed the inaugural Tiahrt Amendment while City of
Chicago v. U.S. Department of Treasury was pending Supreme
Court review as to whether a FOIA exception shielded ATF from
releasing trace data."'4 After Congress passed the 2003 Amendment,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine "what effect, if
any" the Tiahrt rider had on Chicago.' At least one legislator,
Senator Richard Durbin, has noted a belief that Representative
Tiahrt proposed the amendment in order to block legislatively the
Chicago trace data FOIA request.1
3
Starting in 2003, the appropriations bill also required ATF to
include a disclaimer with all trace data releases warning: "Not all
firearms used in crime are traced and not all firearms traced are
used in crime."'44 Additionally, 'The firearms selected [for tracing]
... should not be considered representative of ... all firearms used by
criminals ." The disclaimer cautions against drawing "broad
conclusions" from the data 46 and seems to warn courts against
using the trace data as evidence of firearms industry sales practices
139. Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 644 (2003).
140. H.R. REP. No. 107-575, at 20 (2002).
141. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1018 (2002) (granting cert.).
142. City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 779 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1229 (2003)).
143. 149 CONG. REC. S2422 (Feb. 13, 2003) (statement of Sen. Durbin). Senator Durbin
stated that the Amendment was "an effort by the gun industry to stop cities that are ravaged
by gun criminals from going after the irresponsible gun dealers who are selling guns to
criminals." Id.
144. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 630, 118 Stat. 3, 100.
145. Id.
146. Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-108, § 621, 119 Stat. 2290, 2341 (2005).
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contributing to firearms-related crime.'4 7 Thus, both the events
surrounding the initial Tiahrt Amendment and the accompanying
disclaimer make it clear that the Amendment was passed to inter-
fere with cities' and potential litigants' access to trace data-rather
than for its asserted purpose of protecting law enforcement.
B. 2004
The 2004 Tiahrt Amendment had broader coverage than the
inaugural version. It provided that no ATF funds could be used to
"disclose to the public" any gun trace data maintained pursuant to
the GCA. 14' The key change meant that the 2004 rider prohibited
release to "the public" via any means, whereas the 2003 version only
prohibited release through FOIA.
149
The 2004 Amendment was immediately litigated. In two pending
suits, judges found in favor of data release despite the strengthened
provisions of the 2004 Amendment. In City of New York v. Beretta,5 °
the court found in favor of data release based on its interpretation
of the rider's words "to the public."'' The court granted the City
access to the trace data because "disclosures in ... judicial proceed-
ings" subject to "court-ordered confidentiality" did not constitute
disclosure "to the public."'52 The court also noted that "Congress has,
on other occasions, explicitly prohibited disclosure of ... information
to civil litigants" by specifically declaring that the information "shall
be immune from legal process and shall not be subject to subpoena
or other discovery .... , The court held that Congress's choice not
147. Id. § 621, 119 Stat. at 2342.
148. 118 Stat. 3, 53.
149. Compare id., with Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7,
§ 644, 117 Stat. 11, 473-74 (2003).
150. 222 F.R.D. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (joining cases City of New York v. Beretta with Smith
v. Bryco Arms and Johnson v. Bryco Arms). Beretta was a public nuisance case brought by the
city against various gun manufacturers, importers, and distributors. Smith and Johnson were
private citizens using a theory of negligent marketing and distribution practices to proceed
against the manufacturer of a weapon used against them in an armed robbery termed the
"Wendy's Massacre." Id. at 53; see also Sarah Kershaw, Survivor of Wendy's Massacre Offers
Gruesome Details, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at A27.
151. 222 F.R.D. at 51, 57-59.
152. Id. at 57, 61.
153. Id. at 58 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2055(e)(2) (2000), which prohibits release of certain
consumer product safety reports).
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to use limiting language indicated that it did not intend to shield
the data from use in civil litigation "subject to a confidentiality
order."'54 The Seventh Circuit also ordered data release in City of
Chicago v. United States Department of the Treasury, although that
court focused on the 2004 Amendment's effect on FOIA.'55
C. 2005
Responding to the decisions in City of Chicago and Beretta to
grant the cities access to trace data, Representative Tiahrt 56 re-
wrote the Amendment for the 2005 appropriations bill to include the
limiting language the court found lacking in Beretta.5 ' In its new
terms, the rider provided that:
No funds appropriated ... may be used to disclose [ATF trace
data] ... to anyone other than a ... law enforcement agency or a
prosecutor solely ... for use in a bona fide criminal investigation
or prosecution and then only such information as pertains to the
geographic jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency ... and not
for use in any civil action ... and all such data shall be immune
from legal process and shall not be subject to subpoena or other
discovery.... 158
Thus, the 2005 rider sought to close the loophole that the courts had
used to allow admissibility of trace data in Beretta and City of
Chicago.
The House Appropriations Committee Report accompanying the
2005 rider makes clear that the Committee amended the prior
154. Id. at 64-65. The court found support for this contention in that the legislative history
focused mainly on disclosure to the general public and contained only one reference to the
effect on civil litigants. Id. at 63.
155. City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 384 F.3d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the 2004 rider did not prohibit release of trace data to the City, so long as the
City paid for the costs of production). The City of Chicago court focused on the extent to which
the rider was understood to change substantive FOIA provisions and held that the rider was
not intended to substitute for FOIA provisions and that the rider did not present an
"irreconcilable" conflict with existing FOIA law. Id. at 434.
156. H.R. REP. No. 108-576, at 149 (2004).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
158. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2859
(2004).
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year's rider in response to cases litigated in 2004. The Committee
specifically referenced "recent actions in Federal courts."159 The
Report stated: "In the last two fiscal years the Committee has
expressed serious concern that ... [trace data] have been subject to
release ... to ... civil litigants."'6 ° In this manner, the Committee
attempted to make the Amendment an ironclad bulwark preventing
ATF from releasing trace data to civil litigants. It was partially
effective.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reevaluated its prior
decision in City of Chicago.6' In light of the 2005 rider, the court
reversed its 2004 ruling6 2 that granted Chicago access to trace
data."6 3 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit expressed a belief that
Congress changed the 2005 rider language in response to the court's
2003 decision to allow the city of Chicago access to the data so long
as it bore the expense of production. 6 4 According to the Seventh
Circuit, Congress effectively cut off the flow of trace data to civil
litigants.
In evaluating the 2005 Amendment's effect on Beretta, Judge
Weinstein reached a different conclusion, affirming an order to
disclose trace data to the City. 65 Judge Weinstein based this
decision on a "deeply rooted" "'presumption against retroactive
legislation."" 6 The court noted that a statute does not apply
retroactively "absent clear congressional intent" favoring retroactiv-
ity.'67 The judge found no "clear congressional intent" that the 2005
Amendment deny trace data to litigants with cases already
pending-as contrasted with after-filed suits-when the Amend-
ment was enacted.
159. H.R. REP. No. 108-576, at 30.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2005).
164. Id. at 782.
165. City of New York v. Beretta, 228 F.R.D. 134, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing the
Magistrate Judge's Feb. 22, 2005, Order at 33-34).
166. Id. at 143 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)).
167. Id. at 143-44.
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D. 2006
Although Congress had foreclosed data release to civil litigants in
City of Chicago, it failed to withhold trace data from litigants in City
of New York v. Beretta, Congress responded by adding into the 2006
rider the very language that the Beretta court found lacking-in
refusing to find that the statute applied retroactively-as well as an
additional provision making trace data inadmissible in all civil court
proceedings.'68 The 2006 Tiahrt Amendment, adopted without
debate,'69 added to the 2005 provision the requirement that trace
data
shall be inadmissible in evidence, and shall not be used, relied
on, or disclosed in any manner, nor shall testimony or other
evidence be permitted based upon such data, in any civil action
pending on or filed after the effective date of this Act in any
State ... or Federal court .... o
Although the 2006 Amendment strengthened the provisions of
its previous iteration, Judge Weinstein held that the Amendment
did not bar the City's access to trace data in City of New York v.
Beretta.7' The court held that the limiting words "all such data
shall be immune from legal process" preceding the evidentiary
restriction referred only to trace data "revealed in future disclosures
to law enforcement recipients" using appropriated funds rather than
to the entire universe of previously disclosed and undisclosed trace
data.7 2 In essence, the court interpreted that the only data immune
from legal process was data that law enforcement officials would
request in the future, but that all other trace data was not subject
to immunity.
The court found further support in the "grammatical structure"
of the rider, holding that the words "and then only such information
as pertain to the geographic jurisdiction of the law enforcement
168. Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290, 2296 (2005).
169. City of New York v. Beretta, 429 F. Supp. 2d 517, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
170. 119 Stat. at 2296.
171. Beretta, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
172. Id. at 526.
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agency" used immediately preceding the limitations on data use,
indicated
an intent to link together all of the restrictions, including the
evidentiary restrictions, under the umbrella of the law enforce-
ment data, so that the rider effectively states that ATF may only
use the funds being appropriated to release data to law enforce-
ment recipients "and then only" subject to the restrictions which
follow.17
This reading of the rider results in an incongruous dichotomy in
which data releases to law enforcement are subject to limita-
tions-geographic jurisdiction, immunity from legal process, and
evidentiary inadmissibility-but disclosures to parties other than
law enforcement are unregulated. This is precisely the reading of
the statute that the Seventh Circuit rejected in City of Chicago in
2005, writing that the interpretation was "not ... reasonable" and
was a "strained construction" that ignored the "common-sense
reading of the statute.' 74
E. 2007
Although Congress had continually strengthened Tiahrt Amend-
ment restrictions following every court decision allowing disclosure
of trace information, it did not amend the provision for 2007.
Instead, Congress re-adopted the exact same Amendment as was
used in 2006.175
In the months before Congress passed the 2007 Appropriations
Act, many parties engaged in extensive debate over the Tiahrt
Amendment. New York City's Mayor Bloomberg, in cooperation with
Boston's Mayor Menino, hosted the inaugural Mayors' Summit on
173. Id.
174. City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2005).
175. The Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2007 appropriated funds by approving
various "appropriations Acts," including The Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2007, which contained an identical Tiahrt Amendment as the
one used in the 2006 bill. Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289,
§ 101, 120 Stat. 1311 (2006) (enacting H.R. 5631).
18132009)
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1787
Illegal Guns on April 25, 2006.176 He gathered the mayors of fifteen
major cities to discuss "strategies for stopping the flow of illegal
guns into America's cities. '177 One such strategy was to "[o]ppose all
federal efforts to restrict cities' right to access, use, and share trace
data.'' 8 In April 2006, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence'79
published Without a Trace, a report describing the patterns of gun
trafficking in America, how gun traces can be used to track these
patterns, and how the Tiahrt Amendment serves to deny access to
these vital data. 80
Also in 2006, legislators introduced competing measures to elim-
inate the Tiahrt Amendment' 8' as well as a measure to permanently
codify the Amendment into Title 18.182 All such efforts failed.' By
codifying the Tiahrt Amendment into Title 18, Congress could have
directly limited the use of trace data, rather than only limiting the
use of ATF funds to disclose trace data. As a permanent codification,
the provision would have foreclosed any possible interpretation that
the Amendment was aimed at protecting the public fisc rather than
protecting the trace data. Mayor Bloomberg and MAIG's opposition
to this measure is largely credited for the bill's demise.
176. Press Release, Michael Bloomberg, Mayor Bloomberg, Boston Mayor Menino and
Mayors from Around the United States Stand Up Together in the Fight Against Illegal Guns
(Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2006a/prl29-06.html. This
coalition of mayors later grew into Mayors Against Illegal Guns (MAIG), now a coalition of
240 mayors in 40 states that work together to "share best practices, develop innovative
policies, and support legislation at the national, state, and local levels that will help law
enforcement target illegal guns." Mayors Against Illegal Guns, About the Coalition,
http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/about/about.shtml. MAIG also manages
ProtectPolice.org, an informational website specifically geared toward advocating against the
Tiahrt Amendment. ProtectPolice.org: About, http://www.protectpolice.orgabout.
177. Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2006 Summit, http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.
orglhtmlleventslsummit_2006.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
178. Memorandum from Mayors' Summit on Illegal Guns (Apr. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/summit-principles.pdf.
179. Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, About Us, http://bradycenter.orglabout.
180. See BRADY CTR. To PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 1.
181. See S. 2460, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006); H.R. 5033, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006); S.
2629, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
182. Firearms Corrections and Improvements Act, H.R. 5005, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
183. THOMAS (Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?dl09:
SN02460:@@@X (last visited Mar. 5, 2009); THOMAS (Library of Congress), http://thomas.
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR05033:@@@X (last visited Mar. 5,2009); THOMAS (Library
of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SNO2629:@@@X (last visited Mar.
5, 2009); THOMAS (Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl09:
HR05005:@@@X (last visited Mar. 5, 2009).
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F. 2008
Congress amended the Tiahrt Amendment for 2008. Likely in
response to pressure from MAIG and the Brady Center, Congress
liberalized trace data release to law enforcement officials. As for civil
litigants, the 2008 Tiahrt Amendment arguably restricted the last
avenue for providing data release.
An important change from the 2007 version is that law enforce-
ment is no longer limited to requesting "only such information as
pertains to the [agency's] geographic jurisdiction."'" 4 ATF may also
release data to federal agencies for "national security."' 5 The
Amendment attempts to dispel confusion as to whether localities
may share trace information amongst themselves, adding that "this
proviso shall not be construed to prevent ... the sharing ... of [trace]
information among and between Federal, State, local ... law
enforcement agencies" and prosecutors. 8 ' The provision also does
not prohibit "the publication of annual statistical reports on
[firearms] ... or statistical aggregate data regarding firearms
traffickers and trafficking channels ... and trafficking investiga-
tions.'' 7
One important change from the 2006-2007 Tiahrt provision"8 8 is
that Congress reworded the limitation on the use of data in civil
litigation to eliminate possible interpretations that would allow data
use. The court in City of New York v. Beretta interpreted the 2006
provision in such a manner that the limitation on using trace data
184. Compare Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat.
1844, 1904 (2007), with Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289,
§ 101, 120 Stat. 1311 (2006). However, Congress left intact the restriction that law
enforcement agencies may request trace data "solely in connection with and for use in a
criminal investigation or prosecution" such that a city still cannot request broad trend data
from its surrounding localities. 121 Stat. at 1904.
185. 121 Stat. at 1904. MAIG noted that this excludes state and local agencies.
186. Id.
187. Id. The House Appropriations Committee noted that the 2007 Tiahrt Amendment was
being "interpreted to prevent publication of a long-running series of statistical reports" by
ATF H.R. REP. No. 110-240, at 63 (2007). According to MAIG, the reports in question are
ATF's Crime Gun Trace Reports. MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GuNs FY08 TIAHRT ANALYSIS
(2008), available at http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.orgtdownloads/pdf/fyO8_tiahrt-
analysis.pdf.
188. The 2007 Tiahrt Amendment was identical to the 2006 Amendment. See supra text
accompanying note 175.
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in civil litigation applied only to "such information as pertains to the
geographic jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency requesting"
the data and not to apply to the entire universe of trace data."8 9
Although this interpretation strained the meaning of the rider, it
led to the desirable outcome of granting the City access to trace
data. The 2008 Amendment is not subject to this interpretation. The
wording is structured such that there is only one possible anteced-
ent to the words "all such data shall be immune from legal
process."1" This limitation can only modify the words "the contents
of the ... Trace ... database ... or any information required to be kept"
pursuant to the GCA.19' Any other interpretation of the set of data
targeted by the immunity provision would strain credulity.
MAIG "applaud[ed]" Congress for liberalizing the Tiahrt
Amendment's geographical restrictions on trace data release-to
law enforcement officials-while noting that "too many restrictions
on trace data remain in place." '192
G. Trend and Outlook
Congress liberalized law enforcement access to trace data in the
2008 Tiahrt Amendment. This action reversed a three year trend in
which Congress had continually strengthened Tiahrt from 2003 to
2006. In 2006, Mayor Bloomberg founded MAIG and, in conjunction
with the Brady Campaign, raised congressional and public aware-
ness of the Tiahrt Amendment. Congress did not strengthen the
Amendment for 2007, but merely reauthorized the 2006 version.
The 2008 Amendment liberalized law enforcement access to data.
This congressional reversal can only be the result of increased
public awareness. The increased public awareness and lobbying
efforts by opponents of the Tiahrt Amendment, if continued, may-
and hopefully will-result in a complete abandonment of the Tiahrt
189. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
190. 121 Stat. at 1904.
191. Id.
192. Press Release, Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Mayors Against Illegal Guns Praises
Defeat of Measure that Threatened Police with Prison for Tracking Illegal Guns (Dec. 21,
2007), available at httpJ/www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.orghtm/media-center/prOl4-07.
shtml.
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Amendment. Unfortunately, Congress is on track to reenact the
2008 Tiahrt Amendment for 2009.193
Perhaps the 2009 Tiahrt Amendment will be the last. President
Barack Obama and Vice President Joseph Biden intend to repeal
the Amendment.'94 They believe that the Amendment "restricts the
ability of local law enforcement to access important gun trace
information.195 By repealing the Amendment, they intend to "give
police officers across the nation the tools they need to solve gun
crimes and fight the illegal arms trade." '196 As both houses of
Congress enjoy a majority of Democratic senators and congressmen,
President Obama is unlikely to meet congressional resistance in his
efforts to repeal the Tiahrt Amemdment. 97
Congress and the federal courts have been involved in an
intricate dance for the nearly six year life span of the Tiahrt
Amendment. Congress has repeatedly strengthened the Amend-
ment's restrictions when civil litigants have been granted access to
the data, and the judiciary has responded by finding new ways to
interpret the Amendment to justify data release. Absent from any
congressional consideration is the notion that the Amendment
needed to be strengthened to protect law enforcement, the stated
goal of the measure. There is also no indication that Congress had
to strengthen the rider's provisions because the rider inadequately
protected law enforcement or had in some way resulted in measur-
able harm to law enforcement. Rather, Congress has used the
Amendment as a shield barring civil litigants from using the one
weapon they have in their public nuisance suits against the gun
industry. As the Amendment was not initially passed for the
reasons asserted, it should be abandoned.
193. The Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Bill for 2009 contains a Tiahrt provision identical to that used in 2008. See S. 3182, 110th
Cong. (2008). But see H.R. 1105, 111th Cong. (2009).
194. See Change.gov, Urban Policy, http://change.gov/agenda/urbanpolicy-agenda/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2009).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2008, at Al.
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III. THE TIAHRT AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ABANDONED
Congress should abandon the Tiahrt Amendment. 9 ' Although the
Amendment is defective on many grounds, it is constitutionally
sound.'99 Thus, unconstitutionality will not justify the measure's
abandonment. The strongest arguments for abandoning the Tiahrt
Amendment are that it is redundant of the PLCAA and because the
Tiahrt Amendment does not protect law enforcement officers.
198. This Note advocates abandoning the Tiahrt Amendment by excluding the provision
from the 2009 Appropriations Act. It may, however, be necessary affirmatively to repeal the
Amendment, as it may have attained status as "permanent law" despite its inclusion in year-
to-year appropriations legislation. The Government Accountability Office adopted that view
in an Appropriations Opinion addressed to Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives-Words of Futurity in Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations
Act, B-309704 (Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/309704.pdf.
According to the GAO, the Amendment may be "permanent law" because it contains the
requisite "words of futurity." Id. An appropriations measure is assumed to be "nonpermanent
legislation" unless the language of the statute illustrates an unambiguous congressional
intent to create permanent legislation through an appropriations measure. Id. The GAO
argues that the Amendment's words "funds appropriated under this or any other Act with
respect to any fiscal year" satisfy the requirement for "words of futurity," indicating intent for
permanent legislation. Id.
199. A full analysis of the constitutionality of the Tiahrt Amendment is beyond the scope
of this Note, as the author does not contest the Amendment's constitutionality. Although
litigants have twice challenged the constitutionality of the Tiahrt Amendment, no court has
definitively settled the issue. See City of New York v. Beretta, 429 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 (2d
Cir. 2006); City of New York v. Beretta, 222 F.R.D. 51, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). The Tiahrt
Amendment is likely constitutionally valid. Litigants challenging the Amendment made
arguments that roughly parallel the arguments made in challenging the constitutionality of
the PLCAA, a measure that most courts reaching the issue have held to be constitutionally
valid. See Ileto v. Glock, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1275 (C.D. Cal. 2006); City of New York v.
Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d 244,287 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that the PLCAA was constitutional
under the Commerce Clause because it was within Congress's powers to protect the gun
industry from lawsuits that it found constitute "an unreasonable burden on interstate"
commerce). But cf. Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d 422, 424, 428-29 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to reach the issue of constitutionality when the lower court had held
PLCAA unconstitutional).
1818
TAKING AIM AT TIAHRT
A. The Tiahrt Amendment Is Redundant of the PLCAA- What
Congress Giveth, Congress Taketh Away
President George W. Bush signed the PLCAA into law on October
26,2005.200 The PLCAA allowed specific exceptions to "qualified civil
liability actions" to allow lawsuits involving manufacturer or seller
improprieties to go forward. The Congressional Record is filled with
statements in which legislators argue that the PLCAA does not
grant sweeping immunity for the gun industry against its own
wrongdoing.
201
Twenty-seven days later, the President signed into law the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2006, containing the 2006
version of the Tiahrt rider. This rider, passed with no legislative
history, strengthened previous restrictions on litigants' use of trace
data, requiring that it shall be "inadmissible" in state and federal
courts. Without trace data, it is impossible for a civil litigant to
proceed against a gun industry defendant. Thus, the 2006 and
subsequent Tiahrt Amendments are entirely inconsistent with the
letter and the intent of the PLCAA to allow exceptions for certain
types of lawsuits in which the defendant has violated gun sale laws.
Comparing stand-alone legislation that was debated extensively and
a funding rider amended with no legislative history, the meaning of
the stand-alone legislation better reflects Congress's intentions in
the area of gun litigation. As the Tiahrt Amendment is entirely
inconsistent with the intention of the PLCAA, it should be aban-
doned.
B. The Tiahrt Amendment Does Not Protect Law Enforcement
Congress and ATF assert that the Tiahrt Amendment protects
law enforcement. MAIG and Tiahrt opponents counter that police
are better protected by measures that allow local law enforcement
200. Recent Legislation-Congress Passes Prohibition of Qualified Civil Claims Against
Gun Manufacturers and Distributors, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1940 (2006).
201. See Alden Crow, Shooting Blanks: The Ineffectiveness of the Protection of Lawful
Commerce inArmsAct, 59 SMU L. REv. 1813, 1817-19 (2006) (detailing Senator Larry Craig's
remarks that the PLCAA would not shield the gun industry from its own wrongdoing).
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to eradicate sources of illegal guns that criminals use against them.
The Tiahrt Amendment did not protect Officer Timoshenko. If the
Tiahrt Amendment remains in place, the Amendment will continue
to fail other law enforcement heroes who fall victim to illegal guns.
In analyzing whether the Tiahrt Amendment protects law enforce-
ment, this Note will first analyze exactly how, according to Tiahrt
proponents, trace data release can possibly endanger law enforce-
ment officials. The Note will next argue that the Tiahrt Amendment
is not necessary to protect law enforcement officials from the
dangers of wholesale trace data release, even if the dangers are
taken to be true.
1. How Does Wholesale Trace Data Release Actually Endanger
Law Enforcement?
ATF claims that trace data must be withheld so that criminals do
not learn that they are under investigation. °2 Learning of the
investigation may spur criminals to attempt to impede the investi-
gation, flee, intimidate witnesses, or destroy evidence.0 3 Another
fear is that if entire trace databases are made public-a move that
no Tiahrt opponent advocates-"a suspected gun trafficker could
search databases for names of 'straw purchasers' he had used to
buy handguns."2 4 The trafficker could uncover "names of officers,
informants and other witnesses.""2 5 Tiahrt proponents describe a
doomsday scenario in which a suspected criminal could discover
information linked to the crime gun such as suspected crimes, sus-
pected crime locations, suspects and their associates, law enforce-
ment officer names, and witnesses.2"
202. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Subpoena and Informal Discovery Requests at 14-15, City of Chicago v. U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, 287 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 01-2167).
203. Id.
204. National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action, The 'Tiahrt Amendment"
on Firearms Traces: Protecting Gun Owners' Privacy and Law Enforcement Safety (2007),
http://nraila.orgtIssues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?id=208 (last visited Mar. 5, 2009). The NRA-
ILA, the Institute for Legislative Action, is the NRA's powerful lobbying organization. NRA-
hA, About, http-J/www.nraila.org/About/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
205. The "Tiahrt Amendment" on Firearms Traces, supra note 204.
206. Brief for U.S. Dep't of Treasury Supporting Rehearing En Banc at 29-33, 39-40, City
of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 297 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-2167).
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The Fraternal Order of Police described the following scenario: If
a criminal gains access to trace data as soon as it is posted, he
"learns that a specific firearm is the subject of an ongoing investiga-
tion."2 °7 The criminal is "tipped off' and able to alter his behavior.
This argument assumes: that data released pertain to current
investigations, that the most sensitive fields of the trace database
are released, that those fields are made publicly available, and that
the criminal actually learns of the data and realizes that the
"specific firearm" subject to the investigation is a firearm with
which he is involved. Any number of protective restrictions can
eliminate the already tenuous likelihood that a criminal will learn
that his exact gun is under investigation.
2. Trace Data Release Does Not "Hinder[] Law Enforcement"20 8
Tiahrt proponents' fears are based on a faulty assumption that
trace data used in civil litigation will be freely and fully accessible
to the public. If data is used subject to a confidentiality order, and
attorneys and experts in open court present only summaries based
on raw trace data, there is little chance that the local firearms
trafficker will use trace data to target investigators and witnesses
or to learn of the evidence against him.
Litigation supports the view that trace data release does not
present a danger to law enforcement. In the 2002 City of Chicago v.
U.S. Department of the Treasury litigation, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a lower court decision finding that requested trace data
was not exempted from disclosure under FOIA's law enforcement
privilege exception.2" 9 In holding that the trace data was not
"sensitive" and could not "potentially interfere with law enforcement
207. Brief for the Fraternal Order of Police as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing En
Banc at 5, City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (7th Cir. 2001) (No. 01-2167), 2001 WL
34105552.
208. 150 CONG. REC. S66-02, at S87 (Jan. 21, 2004) (remarks of Sen. McCain) (arguing that
trace data release does not jeopardize law enforcement).
209. City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 287 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2002) (order
for ATF to release data was later reversed based on Tiahrt provisions). ATF claimed that the
data was protected by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) which applies to data "compiled for law
enforcement purposes but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records ... could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. Id. at 633
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2007)).
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proceedings," the court rejected ATF's arguments that releasing
trace data would jeopardize investigations. 1 ° ATF officials testified
that trace data disclosure could lead "an individual [to] piece[] any
withheld information together with what has already been dis-
closed," allowing that individual to "deduce that a particular
investigation is underway. ' 211 ATF also urged the court that data
release could "threaten the safety of law enforcement agents, result
in witness intimidation, or otherwise interfere with an ongoing in-
vestigation. 1 2 The court dismissed ATF's concerns as "only specula-
tive" and noted that ATF could not point out "a single instance" in
which any of ATF's concerns had actually come to fruition. 21 ' ATF
also failed to point to a "single concrete law enforcement proceeding
that could be endangered" by trace data release.1 4 In all, the court
dismissed ATF's contentions as far-fetched hypothetical scenarios
that were not reasonable and did not justify invocation of the FOIA
law enforcement privilege exception. 2 5 Although City of Chicago
was decided under the framework of a FOIA exception, the court's
reasoning is pertinent to the Tiahrt Amendment debate because
ATF and Representative Tiahrt put forward the same flawed law
enforcement protection arguments in favor of withholding trace data
under the Tiahrt Amendment.
In NAACP v. AcuSport, Judge Weinstein rejected ATF's doomsday
arguments as unfounded and made findings of fact indicating
that "[t]hose outside of law enforcement can utilize ... [trace
data] without jeopardizing law enforcement personnel. 216 Judge
Weinstein also found that "[d]isclosure of trace information need not
compromise ongoing or potential criminal investigations, or lead to
injuries to or the death of ATF agents or civilians involved in
undercover investigations."2 '7 Thus, it is doubtful that trace data
release for use in civil litigation, when subject to court-ordered
confidentiality, poses any real threat to law enforcement officials.
210. Id. at 633.




215. Id. at 635.
216. NAACP v. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 505 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
217. Id.
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3. Law Enforcement Privilege Makes the Tiahrt Amendment
Unnecessary
Assuming arguendo that the Tiahrt supporters and Fraternal
Order of Police correctly argue that trace data release endangers
law enforcement officials, this danger is protected against by a
measure apart from the Tiahrt Amendment. In briefing documents
arguing against data release, ATF itself revealed a fundamental
flaw in the pro-Tiahrt argument which posits that the Amendment
is necessary to protect law enforcement officials. In memoranda
opposing trace data release, ATF invoked both the Tiahrt Amend-
ment and, in the alternative, the law enforcement privilege to
justify nondisclosure. ATF has argued that, aside from the Tiahrt
Amendment funding restrictions, ATF is barred from releasing any
trace data that may endanger law enforcement by the Agency's
internal law enforcement privilege rule.218 The rule, codified in 26
C.F.R. § 70.803, prohibits disclosure of "classified information," or
"a confidential source." '219 The internal rule also prohibits ATF from
divulging "investigative records ... if enforcement proceedings would
thereby be impeded."22
ATF has also asserted that potentially harmful trace data enjoy
a protected law enforcement privilege recognized at common law.
221
The Supreme Court outlined a law enforcement privilege pro-
tecting informers in Rovairo v. United States.222 Rovairo recognized
a government "privilege to withhold ... the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to [law enforcement]
officers . Various circuits have expanded the law enforcement
privilege beyond informer anonymity to include a privilege over
"sensitive investigative techniques," "surveillance information, 224
and information that must be withheld in order to "protect witness
218. Memorandum of Law for Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in
Opposition to Subpoena and Informal Discovery Requests at 12, City of New York v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp. (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. CV-00-3641), available at 2004 WL 1175124.
219. 27 C.F.R. § 70.803 (2007).
220. Id.
221. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' Memorandum of Law, supra
note 218, at 12.
222. 353 U.S. 53, 59-62 (1957).
223. Id. at 59.
224. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1002 (1st Cir. 1987).
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and law enforcement personnel," or to "safeguard the privacy of
individuals involved in an investigation. '225
To the extent that trace data are actually sensitive law enforce-
ment information, they are already protected from release by the
law enforcement privilege. Trace data that are not sensitive pose no
risk to law enforcement officials and have not-and need not
be-shielded from disclosure by the law enforcement privilege. The
Tiahrt Amendment, superimposed over the law enforcement
privilege, ensures that civil litigants are denied access to those trace
data fields that could not reasonably pose harm to law enforcement
officials. Thus, to the extent that the Tiahrt Amendment actually
achieves its proponents' stated purposes of protecting law enforce-
ment officials, it is already redundant of the law enforcement
privilege. As to trace data that pose no harm to law enforcement
officials, the Amendment serves only as a device shielding the gun
industry from liability for its own wrongdoing.
C. Law Enforcement Is Best Protected by Sensible Data Release
Pre-Tiahrt, even ATF agreed that trace data could be used to
"prevent" gun crime, and noted: "With information about patterns
and trends, more violent criminals can be arrested more efficiently
... and more gun crime and violence can be prevented." '226 ATF also
acknowledged that a broad base of data was needed, writing: 'The
analysis of a large number of individual traces from many similar
jurisdictions helps identify consistent crime gun patterns that may
not be apparent from information in a single trace or traces from
a single jurisdiction ...."227 However, ATF and Congress now expect
cities to fight crime guns based only on trace information that cities
collect-and perchance share with one another-in connection with
criminal investigations and prosecutions.
As of 2008, law enforcement may request trace data only "in
connection with and for use in a criminal investigation or prosecu-
225. In re Dep't of Investigation of the City of New York, 856 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1988).
226. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, CRIME GUN
TRACE REPORTS (2000) NATIONAL REPORT 1 (July 2002).
227. Id.
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tion."'22 While this provision allows cities to obtain trace data
related to a specific incident or crime, it blocks cities from making
a blanket request for trace data on all guns used in crime in the city
for a specific time period. In addition, a city cannot request a
broader sampling of all crime guns recovered in a larger multi-city
region. Once the city has the trace data in its possession, which it
gained in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution,
the city is allowed to share the information with neighboring
localities; however, this limitation puts the burden on the localities
to cobble together bits of received trace data when those trace data
are already centrally maintained by ATF.229
The 2008 Tiahrt rider took a step toward allowing cities to access
trace data to analyze gun trafficking patterns by permitting ATF to
publish "annual statistical reports on ... aggregate data regarding
firearms traffickers and trafficking channels."23 In this manner,
New York State, for example, can learn that Virginia gun dealers
sell more guns used in New York crimes than any other state;
however, as the report must be limited to aggregate data, New York
could not learn which FFLs in Virginia are "bad apples." New York
can ask the Commonwealth of Virginia to regulate its FFLs more
closely, but does not have the ability to request specific-as opposed
to aggregate-trace data that may be "pertinent, but not directly
related, to a case." Reflecting on this significant impediment, a
Minnesota police chief stated that he is "prohibited from connecting
the dots. 231
Whatever effect trace data may have on law enforcement safety-
and this Note urges that the Amendment hinders law enforcement
safety-the Tiahrt Amendment blocks only one path through which
trace data become part of the public record. There is no limitation
on the use of trace data in criminal prosecutions and, likewise, there
is no restriction on those trace data becoming part of the public
record. If trace data actually endanger law enforcement officers if
released, then it is irrational to limit the use of trace data in civil




231. Nathan Burchfiel, Kennedy Wants Gun Trace Data Made More Widely Available,
CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, June 13, 2007, available at http://inteldaily.com?c=144&a=2370.
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litigation but allow their unrestricted use in criminal prosecu-
tions.2"2 If law enforcement lives are really on the line when trace
data are released, these lives could easily be protected by redacting
confidential trace data from criminal prosecution records; however,
this is not the case. The result is that the same trace data are
absolutely shielded from use in civil litigation but are subject to
unrestricted use and publication in criminal prosecutions.
1. Sensible Data Release: Subject to Confidentiality Order
A better solution, one that meets the needs of criminal prosecu-
tors, civil litigants, and law enforcement, is to adopt a uniform
treatment of trace data in which data may be used in either
proceeding but subject to court-ordered confidentiality. Judge
Weinstein's Order of Protection in NAACP v. AcuSport serves as a
model. In NAACP v. AcuSport, Judge Weinstein ordered ATF to
release certain non-public trace data fields to the counsel for the
plaintiffs subject to a specially tailored confidentiality order.233 The
confidentiality order strictly limited data release to certain
"excepted persons:" the "parties' counsel of record" and necessary
staff and experts who agreed to abide by the Order of Protection on
pain of contempt of court.234 The court order limited the excepted
persons from using the data in any manner other than the AcuSport
litigation."3 5 The order also placed strict requirements on how the
excepted persons had to label, handle, and maintain accountability
of the trace data.236
Excepted persons could use the data to "compile statistics" and
analyses to be presented in court, but the raw data could not be
presented in court.237 In this manner, the raw data-containing
confidential information-never became a part of the public record
232. The City of New York raised this issue in City of New York v. Beretta by arguing that
the Tiahrt Amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause by lacking a rational basis.
Second Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff the City of New York in Opposition to the Court's
Order To Show Cause Why the Case Should Not Be Dismissed Pursuant to the November 22,
2005 Act of Congress at 18-22, City of New York v. Beretta, 429 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (No. 00-CV-3641), available at 2006 WL 1338690.
233. NAACP v. AcuSport, 210 F.R.D. 268, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
234. Id. at 445-46.
235. Id. at 431.
236. Id. at 430-31, 446.
237. Id. at 431.
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and were disclosed to a minimal number of legal professionals
sworn to protect the data from disclosure.
In a motion memorandum opposing release of trace data in
City of New York v. Beretta, ATF wrote that, to the "best" of its
knowledge, Judge Weinstein's confidentiality order use in the
AcuSport trial worked as intended.23 The confidential data were
"not disclosed ... to the court, or to the advisory jury," nor were
they "referred to in any trial exhibit or mentioned in any
testimony." '239 Rather, the excepted persons merely used them to
"compile ... statistics, analyses ... and other studies" to which the
experts testified without disclosing the "underlying Confidential
Information."24 In short, even ATF acknowledged that the AcuSport
confidentiality order was a success.
2. Sensible Data Release: Redact Sensitive Fields
Alternatively, ATF could be allowed to release trace data, for use
in both civil and criminal cases, with the requirement that ATF
redact data fields that could interfere with ongoing investigations.241
Some of the most sensitive law enforcement data-such as the
witnesses to a crime and undercover agents-are not relevant to
public nuisance litigation and need not be released. Civil litigants
need only those data fields that were used in A-1 Jewelry & Pawn.242
None of the data fields used in A-1 Jewelry & Pawn involved
sensitive data. The litigants did not require unlimited data release,
but only needed data to establish the rapidity and frequency with
which a particular seller's guns were used in crimes in New York
City, coupled with other trafficking indicators such as multiple sales
figures.243 To protect against the remote possibility that a criminal
might learn that his particular gun is the subject of an investiga-
tion, the requisite data fields can be disclosed with the firearm
serial number redacted from the reports.
238. ATF Memorandum, supra note 218, at 4.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. ATF has released redacted trace data in the past in order to avoid "compromis[ing] law
enforcement investigations." BRADY CTR. To PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 32.
242. See supra text accompanying note 133.
243. Id.
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Thus, the need to protect the identities of undercover agents and
police informants and to withhold information regarding sensitive
law enforcement methods can be met while still allowing civil
litigants to use trace data to hold "bad apple" gun dealers account-
able. The only reason that Tiahrt supporters would oppose this
common sense approach is if the real motivation for denying civil
litigants access to trace data is to cripple litigants' efforts at suing
the gun industry. The PLCAA, however, already protects the gun
industry from "frivolous" lawsuits and allows suits against only
those sellers who have violated a law related to firearms sales. To
the extent that the Tiahrt Amendment withholds non-sensitive
trace data from civil litigants, it acts as an illegitimate repudiation
of the PLCAA and should be abandoned.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The extensive Tiahrt Amendment and PLCAA litigation leaves
potential civil litigants facing the following situation: Depending on
the jurisdiction, litigants are either entirely barred from using trace
data or are limited to trace data already in hand. If a litigant is
lucky enough to be in the Eastern District of New York, he falls into
the latter category. This will allow the next few years' worth of civil
litigants to use trace data to prove their public nuisance claims, but
even in Judge Weinstein's court, the trace data faucet has already
been turned off. The data in hand will only become older and less
relevant to prove gun sellers' and manufacturers' liability. So, for
the lucky litigants in New York and any locality willing to follow
Judge Weinstein's lead, they must litigate now or forever hold their
breath. In other jurisdictions reading the Tiahrt Amendment more
narrowly, there is no use of trace data.
With regard to the PLCAA, the jurisdictions are likewise split.
Litigants in jurisdictions willing to construe broadly the PLCAA's
meaning to allow suits against defendants who violate any statute
capable of being applied to gun sales will be able to proceed with
public nuisance claims. In jurisdictions holding that the PLCAA's
predicate exception encompasses only violations of statutes directly
relating to firearms sales, the plaintiffs must be able to assert that
the defendant violated such a statute.
Even when the litigant is able to survive the first hurdle of the
PLCAA, she must then be able to make fact-specific allegations
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against the defendants in order to survive immediate dismissal.
Without trace data, this is difficult to do, unless the plaintiff can
allege direct knowledge of the defendant's illegal sales practices. In
the case of a manufacturer or distributor, absent a "smoking gun"
corporate memorandum encouraging these practices, asserting fact-
specific allegations may be impossible. This leaves only the sellers,
those with the emptiest pockets, as the remaining defendants if the
plaintiff can catch the seller making a prohibited sale.
In this manner, the future of public nuisance litigation is likely
to be aimed against sellers rather than distributors and manufac-
turers. For private litigants, this is all but fatal to their hopes of
monetary damage awards. Yet for a municipal plaintiff seeking only
injunctive relief and abatement of the nuisance, this is just the right
medicine. Sellers unable to pay legal fees for this complex litigation
will settle in exchange for court-ordered supervision to ensure that
the sellers obey state and federal gun laws already in place. In this
manner, the use of civil litigation is maximized in order to force
policy change without facing accusations that municipalities are
money-hungry or seek to impose extraterritorially their own laws
on other states. Controversial sting operations,244 such as those used
by New York and Gary, will become crucial for surviving a PLCAA
challenge. City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn is an ideal blue-
print for other municipalities to follow, if only Congress will allow
the guns to "tell" their "stories."
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244. The Virginia Attorney General and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys
sent letters to New York City officials denouncing the sting operations and noting that the
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